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Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Illinois:
The State of the Law at the Close of An Active
Decade
DEAN TIMOTHY JOST*
INTRODUCTION

Administrative agencies in twentieth century America have
greatly expanded in number, size, and power. With this growth, the
power to adjudicate disputes increasingly resides, at least initially,
with the executive branch. Nevertheless, our system of government
has not abandoned a basic allegiance to the eighteenth century
doctrine of separation of powers and to a far older notion that the
ultimate authority for adjudicating rights and duties ought to reside
in the judiciary. As a result, the problem of allocating the power to
decide controversies between administrative agencies and the courts
has become a major legal problem of our time. Illinois courts have
addressed this problem under the rubric of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The last decade has been very active for the development of exhaustion law in Illinois.' Many of the cases evidence a growing tendency to consider the rational bases for exhaustion2 in making decisions. Courts have also become increasingly likely to apply principles developed in cases dealing with one administrative agency to
cases involving another.'
This article will discuss the current state of exhaustion law in
Illinois: the principle, its exceptions, and specific problems with its
application. Throughout the article, an attempt will be made to
understand the cases in terms of the underlying reasons for the
exhaustion principle. This approach should contribute to the demise of parochialism in the application of the exhaustion principle
and to the growth of uniform administrative law in Illinois.
THE EXHAUSTION PRINCIPLE: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The exhaustion principle can be simply stated: if an issue of fact
© Copyright 1979 by Dean Timothy Jost.
* Supervisory Attorney, Elderly Project, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago! B.A.
1970, Adlai Stevenson College, University of California at Santa Cruz; J.D. 1975, University
of Chicago.
1. Nearly two hundred cases have considered exhaustion in the last ten years.
2. See note 7 infra and accompanying text.
3. See cases cited at note 7 infra.
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or law should properly be raised in the first instance before an administrative agency, a court should not address the issue until all
available administrative remedies have been exhausted.4 The exhaustion doctrine is generally a judicial creation. Although the
Administrative Review Act (ARA), 5 also provides for review only of
final administrative decision, it merely restates case law, and has
itself been the subject of extensive judicial construction., The exhaustion principle serves a number of purposes. First, it allows full
development of a factual record before the agency, thus freeing the
court from the burden of fact finding. Second, it allows the agency
to apply its particular expertise to the facts. Then, if the dispute
does end up in court, the reviewing court will have the benefit of the
agency's specialized knowledge. A third benefit of exhaustion accrues where the aggrieved party succeeds before the agency. This
result renders judicial review unnecessary. Finally, requiring exhaustion gives the agency a chance to correct its own errors, c!arify
its policies, and reconcile conflicts.7
The exhaustion doctrine is not strictly jurisdictional.8 Except
4. The rule is analogous to the general rule precluding appellate review until a final
decision has been reached in a trial court proceeding. For other discussions of the exhaustion
principle, see Grippo, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Need or Nuisance, 50 ILL.
BAR. J. 474 (1962); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §20 (1958 and Supp. 1971); 2
COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 572 (1965); JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE

ACTION 424 (1965); B. MEZINES, J. STEIN & J: GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw ch. 49, at 49-1
et seq. (1979).
5.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §264 et seq. (1977).

6. This judicial input has affected the law especially in the area of challenges to statutes,
ordinances or administrative rules on grounds that they are unconstitutional on their face.
See notes 17-46 infra and accompany text.
7. Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 74 Ill. 2d 541, 387 N.E.2d 258 (1979); Illinois
Bell Tel. Co. v. Allphin, 60 111. 2d 350, 326 N.E.2d 737 (1975); Miller v. Illinois Dept. of Pub.
Aid, 69 111. App. 3d 477, 387 N.E.2d 810 (1st Dist. 1979); GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. Allpin,
38 IIl. App. 3d 910, 349 N.E.2d 654 (1st Dist. 1976).
8. The distinction between primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies is frequently drawn by commentators. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE,
§20.02 at 57 (1958); 2 CooPs,

STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 572-73 (1965); JAFFE, JUDICIAL

CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 121 (1965). Professor Davis distinguishes the two doctrines as follows:
The exhaustion doctrine is concerned with the timing of judicial review of administrative action. It is clearly distinguishable from the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
which guides a court in determining whether a court or an agency should take initial
action. When a court holds that it cannot grant the substantive relief sought because only an agency has jurisdiction to grant such relief, the court is applying the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. When a court determines at what state of administrative action judicial review may be sought, the court is either applying the requirement of ripeness, the broad doctrine that governs the kinds of functions that
courts may perform, or the relatively narrow doctrine of exhaustion, which focuses
not upon the functions of courts but merely upon the completion or lack of completion of administrative action.
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where statutes are interpreted to require exhaustion, 9 courts may
exercise their discretion to require or excuse exhaustion. 0 Since the
reasons for exhaustion do not always apply in the particular situation presented to the court, the doctrine admits to many exceptions.
Exhaustion may be excused for challenges against statutes, ordinances, or rules on their face;" challenges to agency jurisdiction; 2
cases where exhaustion would be futile; 3 and, perhaps, in cases
where irreparable injury or fraud are threatened. 4
But many cases in which exhaustion has not been required do not
easily fit any exception. Such abberational decisions are often attributable to two factors: First, the courts have occasionally been
willing to sacrifice uniform interpretation of the law to achieve a
sympathetic result given the facts before them.'5 Second, development of uniform administrative law in Illinois has been slow, and
3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 57 (1958).
While the distinction may be useful in theory, it seldom appears in Illinois cases. Generally,
Illinois courts have subsumed considerations of both the timing of review and of the initial
forum for presenting issues under the exhaustion principle.
The term "primary jurisdiction" appears in Illinois cases only under two circumstances.
First, the issue is raised in several cases where it is claimed that jurisdiction is vested exclusively in federal administrative agencies and that state court jurisdiction is non-existent.
Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 40 Ill. App. 3d 607, 352 N.E.2d 225 (1st Dist. 1976);
Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States Steel Corp., 30 I1. App. 3d 360, 332
N.E.2d 426 (1st Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976). The problem in these cases is
really one of federal preemption or supremacy, not of primary jurisdiction as that term is
generally understood. "Primary jurisdiction" also appears in a series of cases involving actions for utility reparations under §72 of the Public Utilties Act. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 111-2/3,
§75 (1977)..The courts have long held that the Illinois Commerce Commission has exclusive
jurisdiction to consider utility reparations. Therefore, courts dismiss reparation cases which
attempt to bypass the Commerce Commission. See, e.g., Dvorkin v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 34
Ill. App. 3d 448, 452-53, 340 N.E.2d 98, 102 (1st Dist. 1975) and cases cited therein. The use
of the term "primary jurisdiction" in these cases is closer to the usage of the commentators.
Attempts to raise primary jurisdiction arguments outside the utility regulation area have
not caught the attention of the courts. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Svcs., Inc., Ill. App.
3d _
, 396 N.E.2d 552 (4th Dist. 1979); Cushing v. Pittman, 56 111. App. 3d 930, 372 N.E.2d
714 (4th Dist. 1978); Foster v. Allphin, 42 Ill. App. 3d 871, 356 N.E.2d 963 (1st Dist. 1976).
However useful the distinction between exhaustion and primary jurisdiction may be theoretically, it is a distinction which does not appear in the Illinois cases, and which must be
imposed on the cases if its use is desired.
9. See Dvorkin v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 448, 340 N.E.2d 98 (1st Dist. 1975).
10. County of Lake v. MacNeal, 24 Ill. 2d 253, 181 N.E.2d 85 (1962); Stevens v. County
of Lake, 24 Ill. App. 3d 51, 320 N.E.2d 263 (2d Dist. 1974).
11. See notes 17-46 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 47-53 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 54-73 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 74-78 infra and accompanying text.
15. Cf, Northwestern Univ. v. City of Evanston, 74 Ill. 2d 80, 383 N.E.2d 964 (1978)
(exhaustion required before university challenged zoning ordinance); First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. City of Rockford, 47 IIl. App. 3d 131, 361 N.E.2d 832 (2d Dist. 1977) (exhaustion
not necessary before land trust challenged zoning ordinance).
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courts have been very parochial in their consideration of problems
arising from different agencies. Courts still deal largely with cases
as raising Commerce Commission, zoning, or tax problems. Courts
do not usually view a case as involving an administrative law problem. Exhaustion law has thus developed very differently in cases
concerning different agencies.'"
THE EXHAUSTION PRINCIPLE: EXCEPTIONS

The Challenge To A Statute, Ordinance Or Rule On Its Face
Perhaps the most significant exception to the exhaustion doctrine
applies where an administrative rule or a statute or ordinance authorizing administrative action is attacked on its face. The reasons
for this exception are easy to understand. First, it wquld be useless
for the agency to develop a factual record when it is alleged that
the rule, ordinance or statute is void regardless of the facts. Also,
in that situation there is little value in allowing th- agcncy tc apply
its expertise. Moreover, there is little chance that a reconsideration
by the agency will give the aggrieved party relief, because an agency
cannot change an ordinance or statute and probably cannot change
a rule through quasi-judicial action.
Although this exception seems straightforward, aspects of it have
been the subject of recent debate. One unsettled area involves onits-face challenges to rules or regulations of an agency subject to the
7
Administrative Review Act, (ARA) .'

This is an issue on which the ARA is unclear. The ARA provides
for judicial review of "final administrative decisions."'" However,
the term "administrative decision" is defined as not including a rule
or regulation unless the provision is involved in a proceeding before
the agency and its applicability or validity is in issue in such proceedings.1 Where a rule or a regulation is not a "decision," it would
16. Cf., Dvorkin v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 418, 340 N.E.2d 98 (1st Dist. 1975)
(rate regulation-exhaustion required); Fiore v. City of Highland Park, 76 Ill. App. 2d 62, 221
N.E.2d 323 (2d Dist. 1966) (zoning-exhaustion excused).
17. IL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§264-79 (1977).
18. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §265 (1977).
19. The term 'administrative decision' or 'decision' does not mean or include
rules, regulations, standards, or statements of policy of general application issued
by an administrative agency to implement, interpret, or make specific the legislation enforced or administered by it unless such a rule, regulation, standard or
statement of policy is involved in a proceeding before the agency and its applicability or validity is in issue in which proceeding, nor does it mean or include regulations concerning the internal management of the agency not affecting private rights
or interests.
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 110, §264 (1977).
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appear that exhaustion is not required under the ARA before a party
may bring a challenge in court.
Nevertheless, a series of cases in the mid-1970's developed a very
restrictive interpretation of the ARA which required exhaustion before any court challenge could be brought to an administrative rule
or regulation. In People ex rel. Naughton v. Swank,20 several different plaintiffs challenged a public aid regulation. Their complaint
comprised counts for administrative review, mandamus, and class
declaratory relief. The plaintiff in the administrative review count,
who had exhausted administrative remedies, prevailed. In the trial
court the defendant's motion to dismiss the counts requesting mandamus and declaratory judgment was granted because the plaintiff
failed to exhaust.2 The appellate court reversed, holding that the
ARA did not apply and exhaustion was not necessary since the
plaintiffs were not seeking review of a final administrative decision.2" The supreme court reversed, holding that regulations of agen23
cies subject to the ARA could only be reviewed under the ARA.
4
In Ballew v. Edelman, which involved another challenge to a
public aid regulation, the appellate court followed Naughton. The
court observed that the Department of Public Aid had complete
power to establish and amend its standards. Therefore, initial recourse to the department was necessary. In Kenilworth v. Mauck, 5
the court squarely held that a plaintiff could not challenge an administrative rule until the matter had been presented to the agency
for its consideration and correction. And in Cushing v. Pittman,6
the court stated that it could find "no decision extending the
[attack-on-its-face] exception to the [exhaustion] doctrine to a
case involving an internal administrative regulation." 7
In 1978, the supreme court made a sharp about-face on the issues.
8 a provider
In Bio-Medical Laboratories,Inc. v. Trainor,"
of services
under the Medicaid program brought an action to enjoin its suspension from Medicaid participation. The action was based on a challenge to a public aid regulation. The department argued that in20. 58 Ill.
2d 95, 317 N.E.2d 499 (1974).
21. Counts of other plaintiffs were dismissed because the parties lacked standing. Id. at
102-04, 317 N.E.2d at 504.
22. 12 Ill.
App. 3d 43, 297 N.E.2d 784 (1st Dist. 1973). See also People ex rel. Newdelman
v. Swank, 131 Ill.
App. 2d 73, 264 N.E.2d 794 (1st Dist. 1970).
23. People ex rel.
Naughton v. Swank, 58 Ill. 2d 95, 101-02, 317 N.E.2d 499, 504 (1974).
24. 34 Ill. App. 3d 490, 340 N.E.2d 155 (1st Dist. 1975).
25. 50 Ill.
App. 3d 823, 365 N.E.2d 1051 (1st Dist. 1977).
26. 56 Ill. App. 3d 930, 372 N.E.2d 714 (4th Dist. 1978).
27. Id. at 932, 372 N.E.2d at 716.
28. 68 111.2d 540, 370 N.E.2d 223 (1977).
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junctive relief was improper and that the plaintiff should have first
exhausted administrative remedies and then sought a writ of certiorari. The supreme court rejected the department's argument,
holding that exhaustion is excused where an administrative rule is
attacked on its face. 9 Although the ARA did not apply to the program at issue in Bio-Medical, the court did not attempt to distinguish the earlier cases on this basis, and indeed completely ignored
them.
Extension of Bio-Medical to include challenges to rules of agencies under the ARA was not long delayed. In Health Resources
Foundation v. Department of Health,30 an Illinois Appellate Court
allowed an on-its-face challenge without exhaustion even though
the ARA applied. Similarly, in United States Steel Corp. v. Pollution Control Board,3 the court held that, at least as to the Pollution
Control Board, the ARA only covers review of adjudicatory proceedings and not rule-making. Tn Miller v. Illinois Department of tblic
Aid, 32 the appellate court again held that exhaustion is not necessary to challenge a rule on its face in non-ARA situations and
strongly suggested that Bio-Medical overruled Naughton even in
the ARA setting. Finally, in Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control
Board,'3 3 the supreme court held that where a rule asserting agency
jurisdiction is challenged as not authorized by statute, ARA exhaustion is not necessary.
Together these cases establish that an administrative rule may be
challenged as facially violative of a statute or the constitution without exhaustion regardless of whether the ARA governs review.3 4 This
principle seems well grounded in the reasons for the exhaustion
principle. As the court observed in Landfill:
Where an agency's statutory authority to promulgate a rule and
exercise jurisdiction is in issue, no questions of fact are involved.
The agency's particular expertise is not implicated in statutory
construction. Further, there is virtually no chance the aggrieved
party will succeed before an agency where the issue is the agency's
own assertion of authority."
29. Id. at 548, 370 N.E.2d at 227.
30. 61 111. App. 3d 335, 377 N.E.2d 1056 (1st Dist. 1978).
31. 64 Ill. App. 3d 34, 380 N.E.2d 909 (1st Dist. 1978).
32. 59 Il1. App. 3d 477, 482, 387 N.E.2d 810, 814 (lst Dist. 1979).
33. 74 Ill. 2d 541, 387 N.E.2d 259 (1978); see also City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce
Comm'n, 70 Ill. App. 3d 655, 388 N.E.2d 1084 (lst Dist. 1979).
34. But, cf, Sturm v. Block, 72 Ill. App. 3d 306, 390 N.E.2d 912 (3d Dist. 1979) (exhaustion required where statute attacked on its face and as applied and where remedy adequate).
35. Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control. Bd., 74 Ill. 2d 541, 550-51, 387 N.E.2d 258, 261
(1978).
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7

The considerations of judicial economy which underlie the exhaustion doctrine" mandate in this instance that the formality of presenting the challenge to an administrative agency be excused.3 7
While the Bio-Medical case and its progeny broaden the exception for on-its-face challenges, another recent case threatens to severely limit the exception's usefulness. In Northwestern University
v. City of Evanston,3 the Illinois Supreme Court considered a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance. The court acknowledged
that the plaintiff claimed to challenge the statute on its face in the
complaint, but went on to state that one who merely alleges that
an ordinance is unconstitutional on its face does not thereby avoid
the exhaustion requirement. The court said that in order to come
within the exception, a plaintiff must point to language in the ordinance which, without more, reasonably can be said to violate a
39
specific constitutional guarantee.
The Northwestern case highlights an obstacle to use of the on-itsface challenge exception. Although the exception has long been recognized by Illinois courts,40 there has been little consideration in the
cases of precisely how one challenges a statute, ordinance, or rule
on its face. At least three distinguishable possibilities are conceivable: first, one might have to assert that independent of the individualized set of facts raised by the plaintiff, the provision could be
shown to be impermissible; ' second, one might have to argue that
as a matter of law, without considering any evidence, the provision
could be demonstrated to violate the law;4 2 third, one might have
to contend that the illegality of the provision is self-evident absent
36. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
37. An argument for excusing exhaustion in challenging a rule on its face can also be based
on the Administrative Procedure Act. The APA forbids agencies from amending or abrogating
rules without publication and opportunity for public comment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127,
§ §1005-07 (1977). Since there is no possibility of prevailing in a quasi-judicial action challenging a rule on its entirety before an administrative agency, there should be no requirement
that a party bring the contention before the agency.
38. 74 Ill. 2d 80, 383 N.E.2d 964 (1978).
39. Id. at 87, 383 N.E.2d at 968.
40. See, e.g., Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook, 13111. 2d 493, 150 N.E.2d 97 (1958); Bright
v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill. 2d 178, 139 N.E.2d 270 (1957).
41. An example of this approach might concern a zoning ordinance which totally forbids
a certain type of use. It may be necessary to present, evidence as to why the prohibition is
arbitrary and capricious, but the challenge would not turn on the particular facts which the
plaintiff presented.
42. An example of this would be a challenge brought against a state Medicaid regulation
as violative of Title XIX of the Social Security Act. Extensive arguments might be needed
as to the federal statutory and regulatory scheme, or perhaps as to the legislative history of a
provision, but the arguments would be essentially legal.
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any substantial legal argument.43
The language of the Northwestern court seems to adopt the most
restrictive possible meaning of this exception: a requirement of a
challenge based on surface illegality. 44 The holding of the case, on
the other hand, is less restrictive. Northwestern alleged that the
ordinance was arbitrary and unreasonable. To prevail, Northwestern would have had to prove that its planned activities would
not have significantly affected its neighbors. 45 The challenge thus
was really one to the statute as applied, in the classic sense, and
did not fit any definition of the on-its-face challenge exception as
set out above. 6
However, if the court really meant to adopt a surface illegality
requirement, the usefulness of the on-its-face attack exception will
be greatly limited. There are many situations where the illegality
or unconstitutionality of an ordinance, statute or rule could be established by a motion for summary judgment, but is not selfevident. In most of these cases there is little point in allowing the
agency to review the facts or apply its expertise. It is unfortunate
that the court used the Northwestern case, where a narrow holding
was clearly called for, to make sweeping assertions about exhaustion
law. These statements should be reconsidered in future cases with
more consideration for the purposes of the exhaustion doctrine.
The Lack of JurisdictionException
An exception to the exhaustion doctrine has also been recognized
in cases where a party alleges that the agency lacks jurisdiction to
decide the controversy. 47 In fact, some courts have held that exhaus43. An example of this possibility is harder to conceive. Perhaps an ordinance requiring
segregation by race or one outlawing religious meetings would fit this requirement.
44. Compare the pleading requirements of the Northwestern case with those in Pierce v.
Carpenter, 20 Il. 2d 526, 169 N.E.2d 747 (1960), which required that the particular constitutional provision allegedly violated must be pleaded in a facial attack on a statute.
45. The court in the Northwestern case apparently had before it a full transcript from an
administrative hearing (which Northwestern chose to ignore) which provided evidence proving to the court that Northwestern's arguments were certainly not factually self-evident.
46. The Northwestern case also disposed of a problem raised by the earlier cases discussing this exception. The court held that earlier cases requiring that an ordinance be challenged
"as a whole" or "in its entirety" did not really require that every provision of the ordinance
be attacked. A challenge need only be to some part of the ordinance on its face. 74 Ill. 2d at
86-87, 383 N.E.2d at 967-68.
47. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Pollution Control Bd., 59 Ill. 2d 484,322 N.E.2d 11 (1975);
Johnson v. Ogilvie, 47 Ill. 2d 506, 266 N.E.2d 338 (1970); People ex rel. Hillison v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R.R., 22 Ill. 2d 88, 174 N.E.2d 175 (1961); City of Chicago v. F.E.P.C., 32 Ill. App.
3d 242, 336 N.E.2d 359 (1st Dist. 1975); People ex rel. Hennen v. Truemper, 4 Ill. App. 3d
779, 281 N.E.2d 793 (2d Dist. 1972); Horan v. Foley, 39 Ill. App. 2d 458, 188 N.E.2d 877 (1st
Dist. 1963).
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tion may not be excused for any other reason.48 This exception
makes a great deal of sense as there is little point in requiring a
person to endure the delay and expense of exhaustion if the agency's
decision would be void for lack of jurisdiction."
While the exception and its rationale are clear, its application is
not always simple. For example, since jurisdiction is a question of
delegation of power by statute, jurisdiction may exist in an agency
to consider some types of disputes but not others, though the subject
matter is similar. 5° Another uncertain area concerns whether an
agency should be given an opportunity to consider a challenge to its
own jurisdiction before a court action is brought. Possibly, where a
procedure exists to move for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, that
procedure should be exhausted.' Also, where a challenge to the
jurisdiction of an agency is based on lack of procedural due process,
the procedural defect may need to be raised first before the agency. 2
If a jurisdictional challenge fails, the cases and the rationale underlying the exhaustion doctrine indicate that the court should dismiss the case so that the plaintiff may proceed to exhaust." Therefore, if a jurisdictional challenge is weak, it may be wise to exhaust
administrative remedies first and to raise the jurisdictional issue on
appeal rather than to proceed without exhausting and risk having
to exhaust later if the challenge fails.
The Futility Exception
Exhaustion will also not be required where it would be futile.
Initial recourse to an administrative agency may be ineffectual, for
example, where the agency lacks the power to grant a form of relief
48. Head-on Collision Line, Inc. v. Kirk, 36 Ill. App. 3d 263, 343 N.E.2d 54 (1st Dist.
1976). See also Strum v. Block, 72 Ill. App. 3d 306, 390 N.E.2d 912 (3d Dist. 1979).
49. The challenge-to-jurisdiction exception to the exhaustion doctrine may be closely
related to the on-its-face challenge exception. See notes 17-46 supra and accompanying text.
Often the statute or rule challenged on its face is the statute or rule giving the agency
jurisdiction over the situation before the court. See Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd.,
74 Ill. 2d 541, 387 N.E.2d 258 (1978); Bio-Medical Laboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill. 2d 540,
370 N.E.2d 223 (1977).
50. Johnson v. Ogilvie, 47 Ill. 2d 506, 266 N.E.2d 338 (1970); Korzen v. Piper's Alley Corp.,
35 Ill. App. 3d 449, 342 N.E.2d 249 (1st Dist. 1976).
51. See W.F. Hall Printing Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 16 Ill. App. 3d 864,
306 N.E.2d 595 (lst Dist. 1973).
52. Kenilworth Insurance Co. v. Mauck, 50 Ill. App. 3d 823, 365 N.E.2d 1051 (1st Dist.
1977).
53. County Treasurer v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 753, 326 N.E.2d
120 (1st Dist. 1975); Colton v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 349 Ill. App. 490, 111 N.E.2d 363
(1st Dist. 1953).
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requested, 4 or where it has already shown clearly that it will decide
against the plaintiff. Until recently, the futility exception had made
little headway outside of the zoning area. For example, taxpayers
had been compelled to exhaust remedies even though they had been
denied administrative relief in previous years for the same taxes."
Also, optometrists were not excused from exhaustion despite allegations that the board which would have heard their case was composed of competitors who were members of an association which
opposed plaintiff's method of doing business. 5 The court held that
absent a showing of prejudice or incompetence of individual members of the board, exhaustion was necessary. 7
In public utility cases the exception has fared even worse. Courts
have required exhaustion despite claims that the same issue had
lost before in Commerce Commission hearings or that decades of
consistent Commission policy made the supposed administrative
remedy "!argely a fiction or illusion." 58
Nevertheless, recent developments have indicated the willingness
of the court to extend the futility doctrine beyond the zoning area.
In Miller v. Department of Public Aid,5 the plaintiff challenged a
public aid policy. Because the body responsible for providing an
administrative hearing had no power to change the policy, exhaustion was excused as futile. Similarly, in Sanitary District v. Illinois
Pollution Control Board,10 the court excused exhaustion because the
administrative agency lacked the power to grant the particular form
of relief sought.
There is no inherent reason why the futility exception should be
limited to the zoning area. Courts properly refuse to consider claims
of the predisposition or inclination of administrative bodies against
petitioner. But if an agency has no power to decide an issue or
previously has passed on the same issue raised by the same party,
54. The futility and challenge-to-jurisdiction exceptions to the exhaustion principle are
closely related. One of the reasons for the challenge-to-jurisdiction exception is the futility
in pursuing a remedy which can only result in a void order. The futility exception has been
applied in cases where the agency lacked the power to provide a remedy appropriate to the
needs of the aggrieved party, even though it had jurisdiction over the area of law in general.
See cases at notes 59 and 60 infra. People ex rel. Korzen v. Fulton Market Cold Storage Co.,
62 Ill. 2d 443, 343 N.E.2d 450 (1976); People ex rel. County Collector of St. Clair v. Bostwick,
33 Il1. 2d 74, 210 N.E.2d 189 (1965).
55. People ex rel. County Collector of St. Clair v. Bostwick, 33 Ill. 2d 74, 210 N.E.2d 189

(1965).
App. 2d 320, 260 N.E.2d 123
56. Salk v. Department of Registration & Education, 123 Ill.
(1st Dist. 1970).
57. Id. at 325, 260 N.E.2d at 125.
58. Dvorkin v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 34 Ill. App. 3d 448, 456, 340 N.E.2d 98, 105 (1st Dist.
1975); Adler v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 57 Ill.
App. 2d 210, 206 N.E.2d 816 (1st Dist. 1965).
59. 69 Ill. App. 3d 477, 387 N.E.2d 810 (1st Dist. 1979).
60. 66 Ill. App. 3d 251, 383 N.E.2d 996 (4th Dist. 1979).
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exhaustion should be excused. The Miller and Sanitary District
cases should indicate a willingness of the courts to expand the futility exception beyond zoning.
The most common variant of the futility exception permits a
party to go directly to court for a remedy if another similar remedy
has been denied by the agency. An early statement of this "multiple
remedies" exception is found in Herman v. Village of Hillside." In
Herman, the property owner had petitioned the Board of Appeals
for an amendment of the zoning ordinance. After a hearing, he was
denied relief. He then sued. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the owner should have exhausted administrative remedies
by applying for a variation. The supreme court noted that it would
have been a useless exercise to apply to the same board for similar
relief. That process would have wasted time and money. Therefore,
2
it was unnecessary.1
The multiple remedies exception has experienced the most vitality in the zoning area, 3 where a variety of remedies are often available. 4 It has been applied where an amendment was sought but not
a variance,15 or a variance but not an amendment," where a plan
was changed slightly after administrative remedies were pursued
but before suit was filed," or where the zoning authorities otherwise
took action which indicated that further exhaustion was useless."
61.
62.

15 Il. 2d 396, 155 N.E.2d 47 (1958).
The same board of appeal would have had jurisdiction over a variation [as over
the amendment], and it is unreasonable to assume that it would reverse itself
and grant practically the same relief. To insist on the additional useless step would
merely give lip service to a technicality and thereby increase costs and delay the
administration of justice, which is the very thing we are trying to avoid. The action
here taken was a reasonable equivalent with the meaning and spirit of the cases
above cited.
Id. at 408, 155 N.E.2d at 53.
63. For an earlier interpretation of the zoning cases, see Fox, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies in Zoning Disputes, 40 CI. BAR Rc. 119 (1958); Scott, Judicial Review of
Zoning Decisions in Illinois, 59 ILL. BAR J. 228, 228-30 (1970).
64. Indeed, the exception has on occasion been described as only applicable to zoning
cases. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Allphin, 60 Ill. 2d 350, 326 N.E.2d 737 (1975); GTE
Automatic Elec. Inc. v. Allphin, 38 Ill. App. 3d 910, 349 N.E.2d 654 (1st Dist. 1976).
65. Liebling v. Village of Deerfield, 21 Ill. 2d 196, 171 N.E.2d 585 (1961); Herman v.
Village of Hillside, 15 Ill. 2d 396, 155 N.E.2d 47 (1959); Wheeling Trust & Savings Bank v.
Village of Mt. Prospect, 54 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 382 N.E.2d 128 (1st Dist. 1978).
66. Howard v. Lawton, 22 Ill. 2d 331, 175 N.E.2d 556 (1961); Lantry v. Village of Homewood, 64 IIl. App. 2d 428, 212 N.E.2d 105 (1st Dist. 1965).
67. Sulzberger v. County of Peoria, 29 Ill. 2d 532, 194 N.E.2d 287 (1963); Wiercioch v.
Village of Niles, 27 Ill.2d 363, 189 N.E.2d 278 (1963); Northbrook Trust & Savings Bank v.
County of Cook, 47 11. App. 3d 879, 365 N.E.2d 433 (1st Dist. 1977); O'Connor v. Village of
Palos Park, 31 111. App. 3d 528, 333 N.E.2d 276 (1st Dist. 1975); Tomasek v. City of Des
Plaines, 26 111.App. 3d 586, 325 N.E.2d 345 (1st Dist. 1975).
68. La Salle Nat'l Bank v. City of Evanston, 57 Ill. 2d 415, 312 N.E.2d 625 (1974); Van
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Even in the zoning area, this exception has been subject to limits."9 At a minimum, the exception requires that at least one appropriate remedy of a similar nature has been fully exhausted. Thus,
if the property owner pursues an improper remedy, 0 or pursues a
substantially different remedy than that denied earlier,7 ' exhaustion
is still required. Further, where the claim of futility is based solely
on the speculation of an administrative officer that the board of
appeals will deny an application, exhaustion is not excused."
The multiple remedies variant of the futility exception appeals to
common sense. Generally, it is unlikely that a body which denies
one remedy will grant another to the same petitioner on the same
facts. However, courts applying the exception often overlook the
distinctions between different remedies." Where these distinctions
are significant, an attempt to pursue a different administrative remedy may not be futile.
The IrreparableInjury And Fraud Exceptions
Two potential exceptions to the exhaustion principle are mentioned occasionally in cases but seldom appear as actual reasons for
Laten v. City of Chicago, 38 Il. 2d 157, 190 N.E.2d 717 (1963); Fiore v. City of Highland Park,
76 Ill. App. 2d 62, 221 N.E.2d 323 (2d Dist. 1966).
69. Additionally, Northwestern Univ. v. City of Evanston, 74 Ill. 2d 40, 383 N.E.2d 964
(1978), may have narrowed this exception. In the Northwestern case, the plaintiff initiated
zoning proceedings but then went directly into court. Northwestern subsequently lost the
administrative proceedings and argued to the court that further exhaustion would be futile.
The court rejected this argument, holding that a party cannot pursue judicial and administrative remedies simultaneously and then claim futility if it loses the administrative proceedings
before it receives a trial on the merits.
The court also disagreed with Northwestern's contention that the history of litigation
surrounding the challenged ordinance made it unlikely that it would succeed on the merits.
It then stated that "[tlhe exhaustion requirement cannot be avoided simply because relief
may be, or even probably will be, denied by the local authorities." Id. at 89, 383 N.E.2d at
969. This broad of a statement was not needed to decide the case. The court's finding that
administrative recourse would not be useless would have been sufficient. If taken literally,
the statement could significantly narrow the multiple remedies variant ot the futility exception.
70. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Chicago, 110 Ill. App. 2d 47, 249 N.E.2d
148 (1st Dist. 1969).
71. National Brick Co. v. City of Chicago, 92 Ill. App. 2d 192, 235 N.E.2d 301 (1st Dist.
1968).
72. Bank of Lyons v. County of Cook, 13 Ill. 2d 493, 150 N.E.2d 97 (1956). But see Sinclair
Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406 (1960), where exhaustion was excused because the court's supposition that administrative relief was unlikely.
73. See, e.g., Bright v. City of Evanston, 10 Ill. 2d 178, 185-86, 139 N.E.2d 270, 274 (1956):
A variance by its nature is a limited exception to be granted in a special case while
an amendment, a much broader remedy, may in the same case be inappropriate.
On the other hand, a unique hardship sufficient to justify a variance may not exist
in a situation where an amendment may be acceptable to a zoning body.
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excusing exhaustion. These exceptions permit initial recourse to the
courts to prevent irreparable injury or because of fraud by an administrative agency.
The irreparable injury exception is analogous to the exception to
the principle that equity will not assume jurisdiction in a case if
there is an adequate remedy at law.74 Avoidance of irreparable injury is the classic ground for exercising equitable jurisdiction.75"
When the irreparable injury exception is mentioned in the cases,
however, it is almost inevitably only to state that irreparable injury
7
has not been shown. 6
In one case where the exception was applied, the court did not
even mention irreparable injury. In Buege v. Lee, 7 a police officer
was allowed to bring a declaratory judgment action to challenge a
departmental regulation because the only administrative remedy
available was disciplinary proceedings consequential to refusing to
obey the regulation. The court, in effect, held that the plaintiff
might be irreparably injured if compelled to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Cases frequently do mention fraud by the administrative body
as grounds for avoiding exhaustion.78 However, it is difficult to
conceive of a situation where allegations of fraud on the part of an
agency would be accepted by a court. Accordingly, it is not surprising that this exception has gained nothing more than lip service.
EXHAUSTION: OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Because of the exhaustion doctrine, practice in the administrative
law area involves a consideration of many special problems. For
example, procedural planning must embrace an awareness of the
necessary timing of exhaustion, the means of solving problems
caused by an uncooperative agency, the availability of judicial review and the effect of failure to exhaust on the ability to defend
subsequent actions. Additionally, there are areas where the exhaustion doctrine's applicability will be uncertain, such as in declaratory
74. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Allphin, 60 Ill. 2d 350, 358, 326 N.E.2d 737, 742 (1975).
75. K.F.K. Corp. v. American Continental Homes, Inc., 31111. App. 3d 1017, 335 N.E.2d
156 (2d Dist. 1975).
76. Graham v. Illinois Racing Bd., Ill. 2d -, 394 N.E.2d 1148 (1979); Bulk Terminals Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 65 Il1. 2d 31, 357 N.E.2d 430 (1976); Village
of South Elgin v. Waste Management Inc., 64 Ill. App. 3d 565, 381 N.E.2d 778 (2d Dist.
1978); Dunlap Lake Property Owners Assn, Inc. v. City of Edwardsville, 22 Ill. App. 2d 95,
159 N.E.2d 4 (4th Dist. 1959).
77. 56 Ill. App. 3d 793, 372 N.E.2d 427 (2d Dist. 1978).
78. People ex rel. Wallace v. Willis, 53 Ill. App. 3d 760, 368 N.E.2d 1127 (4th Dist. 1977);
Adler v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 57 Il. App. 2d 210, 206 N.E.2d 816 (1st Dist. 1965).
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judgment actions, or unusual, as in tax cases. These potential problem areas will now be examined.
Procedural Considerations
Where the exhaustion doctrine applies, certain procedural problems need to be considered. Of primary importance is the timing of
exhaustion and the ramifications of failing to meet statutory time
limits. Where a statutory administrative hearing must be requested,
a party who fails to seek administrative relief within the time limit
loses the right to a hearing.7" Further, a court may not subsequently
consider evidence which could have been offered at such a hearing. 0
Similarly, where an appeal from an administrative decision is not
brought within the time period set out by the review statute, the
right to judicial review is forfeited. 8' Somewhat less obviously, if an
administrative agency grants a rehearing which is not permitted by
Statute, the petitioner forfeits his right to judicial review if the time'
limit for appeal from the initial decision runs out while the rehearing is progressing. 2
Once administrative review is initiated, a problem may arise
where the exhaustion attempt is stalled by a recalcitrant agency.
Where an agency refuses to take action or unduly delays its proceedings, several cases indicate that a writ of mandamus may be appropriate. In People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders v. Village of
Morton Grove, " a landowner tendered a revised plot plan to a building commissioner who refused to accept or examine the plan. The
landowner petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel action. The
village argued that the court should dismiss for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies through the zoning board of appeals. The
supreme court, however, upheld issuance of the writ. The court
held that the building commissioner's refusal to make a decision
excused exhaustion since the board's jurisdiction was limited to
review of decisions. Similarly, the more recent case of People ex rel.
Shell Oil Co. v. City of Chicago,84 upheld the issuance of a writ of
mandamus because of the city's "inordinate delay."
79. Miller v. Daley, 14 Ill. App. 3d 394, 302 N.E.2d 347 (1st Dist. 1973).
80. Id.
81. Beam v. Erve, 133 Ill. App. 2d 193, 272 N.E.2d 685 (1st Dist. 1971).
82. Pearce Hospital Foundation v. Public Aid Comm'n, 15 Ill. 2d 301, 154 N.E.2d 691
(1958); Klaren v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs of Westmont, 99 Ill. App. 2d 356, 240
N.E.2d 535 (2d Dist. 1968); Oliver v. Civil Service Comm'n of Chicago, 80 Ill. App. 3d 329,
224 N.E.2d 671 (lst Dist. 1967).
83. 16 Ill. 2d 183, 157 N.E.2d 33 (1959).
84. 9 Ill. App. 3d 242, 292 N.E.2d 84 (1st Dist. 1972).
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These holdings are consistent with dicta in cases which observe
that mandamus is available if a hearing is refused, 5 or if a stay is
inappropriately denied. 8 The decisions would also seem correct as
a matter of policy. If a statute establishes an administrative remedy, an agency should have a duty to provide the procedure necessary to obtain that remedy. If that procedure is refused or inordinately delayed, mandamus is the appropriate writ to compel execution of that duty.
Even where the agency does not delay deciding the matter, a
party may have trouble securing judicial review. The availability of
judicial recourse depends on whether the party adequately raised
the appealed issues before the agency. In accord with the analogy
to judicial appellate practice, arguments not raised before an administrative agency may not be relied on in a subsequent appeal! 7
An exception to this requirement may exist for challenges to the
jurisdiction of an agency 8 or facial challenge to statutes, ordinances,
or rules." It would be unfair to penalize the plaintiff for failing to
make a particular argument in those areas since the challenges do
not involve resolution of the factual issues presented in the dispute.
One final procedural consideration concerns whether failing to
exhaust precludes defending a subsequent action brought by the
agency. Failure to exhaust generally prohibits defending a collection
or enforcement action. 0 For example, in People ex rel. Peterson v.
Turner, Co."' the court held that unless a recognized exception9 2 to
the exhaustion doctrine is raised as a defense, failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and statutory forms of review precludes
collateral attack through defense of enforcement proceeding. 3
In Peterson, the defendant was contesting a Fair Employment
85. Korzen v. Piper's Alley Corp., 35 Ill. App. 3d 449, 342 N.E.2d 249 (1st Dist. 1976);
County Treasurer v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 753, 326 N.E.2d 120
(1st Dist. 1975).
86. City of Wheaton v. Chicago, Ap. & E. Ry. Co., 3 Ill. App. 2d 29, 120 N.E.2d 370 (lst
Dist. 1954).
87. Jewell v. Carpentier, 22 Ill. 2d 445, 176 N.E.2d 767 (1961); Leffler v. Browning, 14 Ill.
2d 225, 151 N.E.2d 342 (1958); Robert S. Abbot Publishing Co. v. Annunzio, 414 Ill. 559, 112
N.E.2d 101 (1953).
88. See notes 47-53 supra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 17-46 supra and accompanying text. See also Howard v. Lawton, 22 Il. 2d
331, 175 N.E.2d 556 (1961).
90. People v. Koushiafes, 42 11. 2d 483, 248 N.E.2d 81 (1969), leaves open the question of
whether failure to exhaust precludes defense in criminal proceedings.
91. 37 Ill. App. 3d 450, 346 N.E.2d 102 (2d Dist. 1976).
92. Such as a constitutional attack to the ARA or an attack on the jurisdiction of an
agency. See note 17-53 supra and accompanying text.
93. 37 Ill. App. 3d 450, 463 n.5, 346 N.E.2d 102, 113 n.5.
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Practices Commission enforcement action without seeking review of
the final administrative decision under the ARA. The trial court had
nevertheless refused to strike the company's defenses. The appellate
court reversed and remanded holding that the defenses raised issues
which should have been raised through exhaustion of administrative
remedies and through ARA review.
The Peterson decision is in accord with the majority of cases
which previously addressed this question. 4 It also comports with the
purposes of the exhaustion doctrine. If a defendant could ignore
administrative proceedings but then challenge administrative actions in court any time judicial proceedings were necessary to enforce the agency's decision, the exhaustion doctrine would be rendered meaningless.
Nonetheless, courts have excused exhaustion and permitted assertion of the defense," using a variant of the futility doctrine. The
courts reasoned that since the agency was willing to prosecute, it
probably would not reconsider its decision through administrative
proceedings. Thus, resort to those proceedings would be futile. Were
this argument universally accepted, of course, it would eliminate
the exhaustion requirement in all instances where enforcement proceedings exist.
The Effect Of The DeclaratoryJudgment Act On The Exhaustion
Principle
Application of the exhaustion doctrine is uncertain where parties
seek declaratory judgments. The Declaratory Judgment Act gives
courts the discretion to construe statutes, ordinances, and other
governmental regulations." As such, the Act could be interpreted as
creating a remedy independent of the exhaustion requirement for
construing statutes, ordinances, or regulations as they apply to a
particular controversy.
Although one court has held that the Act excuses exhaustion,"
94. Calderwood Corp. v. Mahin, 57 Ill. 2d 216, 311 N.E.2d 691 (1974); Dep't of Finance
v. Kilbane, 381 Ill. 117, 44 N.E.2d 868 (1942) (taxation); Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 15
Ill. 2d 204, 154 N.E.2d 265 (1958); Fitt v. Central Ill. Pub. Services Co., 273 Ill. 617, 113 N.E.
155 (1916) (industrial board); Dep't of Mental Health v. Beil, 44 Ill. App. 3d 402, 357 N.E.2d
875 (4th Dist. 1976); In re Estate of Hartseil, 4 Ill. App. 3d 80, 279 N.E.2d 778 (3d Dist. 1972)
(mental health assessments); City of Chicago v. Zellers, 64 Ill. App. 2d 24, 212 N.E.2d 737
(1st Dist. 1965) (zoning).
95. County of Lake v. Mac Neal, 24 Ill. 2d 85 (1962); City of DesPlaines v. La Salle Nat'l
Bank of Chicago, 44 Ill. App. 3d 815, 358 N.E.2d 1198 (1st Dist. 1976).
96. See notes 54-73 supra and accompanying text.
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §57.1 (1977).
98. Two Hundred Nine Lake Shore Drive Bldg. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. App. 3d
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courts generally reject this conclusion, though for varying reasons.
Under principles of statutory construction, some courts hold that
the more specific provisions of the ARA govern over the more general provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act." Thus, exhaustion
of administrative remedies with ARA review is an exclusive remedy
where the ARA applies. A different approach was taken in Rasky v.
Anderson.'0 The Rasky court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it dismissed a declaratory action brought
to avoid exhaustion. This view vitalizes the exhaustion doctrine
without foreclosing a trial court's consideration of a non-exhausted
declaratory judgment action in some cases.
In principle, the cases upholding the exhaustion requirement are
correct. There is no inherent reason why the exhaustion doctrine
should be any less applicable to cases subject to declaratory relief.
The legislature should not be presumed to have overruled such a
deeply entrenched doctrine unless that intention is clearly demonstrated. That purpose is not plainly expounded by the Declaratory
Judgment Act.
Special Exhaustion Problems In Taxation Proceedings
A consideration of the exhaustion doctrine is incomplete without
some attention to the peculiarities of its application in the taxation
area. In tax cases, as elsewhere, administrative remedies ordinarily
must be exhausted.'' This procedure is required as a precedent to
equitable as well as legal remedies.0 2 Moreover, exhaustion is necessary even though the relief sought was denied the taxpayer in earlier
years. 10 3 There are exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, however,
which are recognized only in the tax area.
Until recently, one such exception existed for challenges to taxes
unauthorized by law or imposed on exempt entities. This exception,
46, 278 N.E.2d 216 (lst Dist. 1972). Of course, declaratory judgment may be available as a
means of relief if a case falls within one of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. See
Buege v. Lee, 56 Ill. App. 3d 793, 372 N.E.2d 427 (2d Dist. 1978); Herman v. Village of
Hillside, 15 11. 2d 396, 155 N.E.2d 47 (1959).
99. East Main Township Community Ass'n v. Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank, 15 Ill. App.
2d 377, 141 N.E.2d 739 (lst Dist. 1957); Sheridan Shores v. Chicago, 13 Ill. App. 2d 377, 141
N.E.2d 739 (1st Dist. 1957).
100. 62 Ill. App. 3d 633, 379 N.E.2d 1 (1st Dist. 1978).
101. People ex rel. Korzen v. Fulton Market Cold Storage Co., 62 II1. 2d 443, 343 N.E.2d
450 (1976); People ex rel. Nordlund v. Lans, 31 Ill. 2d 477, 202 N.E.2d 543 (1967); County
Treasure v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 753, 326 N.E.2d 120 (1st Dist.
1975).
102. Shappert Eng'r Co. v. Weitemeyer, 34 Il1. 2d 97, 213 N.E.2d 530 (1966).
103. People ex rel. County Collector of St. Clair v. Bostwick, 33 I1. 2d 74, 210 N.E.2d 189
(1965).
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as recognized in Owens Illinois Glass v. McKibbin,0 4 grew out of a
group of rather complex exceptions to the doctrine that equity will
not assume jurisdiction where there is an adequate remedy at law.
The exception continued to be recognized until 1974. In Calderwood
Corp. v. Makin, 0 5 the supreme court held that a taxpayer's failure
to request a hearing on an assessment within the twenty day statutory appeal period resulted in a final administrative decision reviewable only under the ARA, regardless of the Owens exceptions.
In Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Allphin, 0 1 the supreme court
went further and overruled the Owens doctrine as to all cases in
which administrative decisions are reviewable under the ARA. Illinois Bell had brought an action for equitable relief to challenge an
application of the Messages Tax to its business. Bell went directly
to court, ignoring the provisions for administrative hearings and
review provided by law. Bell claimed the impositions of the tax
complained of were unauthorized by law and thus an injunction was

appropriate under the Owens doctrine. The trial court tolled the
twenty day review period, thus obviating the final administrative
decision problem of Calderwood. The supreme court, however, recognized the irrationality of the Owens exception and overruled the
Owens line of cases.'0 7
Illinois Bell has been followed in cases dealing with income
taxes'0 8 and exempt organizations. 09 The problem of its application
to property tax appeals in counties with a population not exceeding

1,000,000, where administrative remedies are provided by statute,"0
has been raised but not decided."' The Owens doctrine retains vital104. 395 Il1. 245, 52 N.E.2d 177 (1943).
105. 57 Ill. 2d 216, 311 N.E.2d 691 (1974).
106. 60 I11. 2d 350, 326 N.E.2d 737 (1975).
107. Although the court overruled Owens prospectively, it allowed Bell to proceed with
its action for injunctive relief without exhaustion stating that "fundamental fairness" required that Bell's reliance on the Owens doctrine be honored. This action was followed in StaRa Corp. v. Mahin, 64 Ill. 2d 330, 356 N.E.2d 67 (1976) and Keystone Consol. Indus. Inc. v.
Allphin, 45 Ill. App. 3d 714, 359 N.E.2d 1202 (3d Dist. 1977). These cases may presage the
creation of the new "fundamental fairness" exception to the exhaustion doctrine. See Gray,
Administrative Law in Illinois: Recent Trends and Developments, 8 Lov. Cm. L.J. 511, 53740 (1977). It is hoped that this exception will not grow beyond the situation at issue in the
Allphin case where a party in good faith relies on another exception to the exhaustion principle which is prospectively overruled.
108. GTE Automatic Elec. Inc. v. Allphin, 38 Il1. App. 3d 910, 349 N.E.2d 654 (1st Dist.
1976).
109. Christian Action Ministry v. Dep't. of Local Gov't Affairs, 74 I1. 2d 51, 383 N.E.2d
958 (1978).
110. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, §§592.1-592.5 (1977).
111. Uretsky v. Baschen, 47 Ill. App. 3d 169, 174 n.1, 361 N.E.2d 875, 879 n.1 (2d Dist.
1977).
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ity as a basis for equitable jurisdiction,"' but should be dead as an
independent ground for avoiding exhaustion." '
A second narrow exception to the exhaustion principle in tax
cases permits attack on equalization decisions concerning real property taxes without exhausting administrative and legal remedies."'
This exception is based on the language and history of the applicable statute." 5 Moreover, equalization decisions are preeminently
mathematical and legal in nature, not requiring the application of
administrative expertise to factual situations.
Finally, additional exceptions to the exhaustion principle are
found in the tax area because of the existence of multiple statutory
remedies requiring varying degrees of exhaustion. Thus, the supreme court held"' that a taxpayer has the option of either choosing
to exhaust administrative remedies under Department of Revenue
procedures,"' or paying under protest and bringing a direct action
for refund under the protest act."' And in counties with a population
under 1,000,000, a taxpayer may either pay his taxes under protest
and object to collection,"' or appeal to the state Property Tax Appeals Board' 20 and seek review under the ARA.' 2 '
CONCLUSION

The development of an orderly and uniform administrative law
in Illinois is still in its early stages. Courts continue to be more likely
to decide a case with review only of precedent concerning the agency
involved or to be swayed by the equities of the case. They are less
likely to consider how the facts with which they are presented
should be analyzed in terms of the broad exhaustion considerations
set out in this article.
112. See, e.g, Inolex Corp. v. Rosewell, 72 Ill. 2d 198, 380 N.E.2d 775 (1978).
113. Of course, an issue formerly cognizable within an exception under the Owens doctrine might still fit into an exception to the exhaustion doctrine, for instance the void-onits-face exception. See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Allphin, 60 Ill.
2d 350, 358, 326 N.E.2d 737,
742 (1975).
114. People ex rel. Boylan v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 72 II1. 2d 387, 381 N.E.2d 276
(1978); People ex rel. Hillison v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co., 22 Ill. 2d 88, 174 N.E.2d 175
(1961); see also Christian Action Ministry v. Department of Local Gov't Affairs, 74 Ill. 2d
51, 383 N.E.2d 958 (1978).
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §619 (1977).
116. Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. Co. v. Department of Revenue, 63 Ill.
2d 474, 349 N.E.2d
22 (1976).
117. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§439.19, 439.20 (1977).
118. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, §72 (1977).
119. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §716 (1977).
120. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§592.1-592.5 (1977).
121. Uretsky v. Baschen, 47 Ill. App. 3d 169, 361 N.E.2d 875 (2d Dist. 1977); Stevens v.
State Property Tax Appeals Bd., 42 Ill.
App. 3d 550, 356 N.E.2d 355 (4th Dist. 1976).
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Nevertheless, recent development may presage a change in approach. For example, the on-its-face challenge exception has been
extended to include attacks involving a variety of agencies under a
short period of time. Also, the peculiar Owens exception has been
eliminated in the taxation area as an exhaustion exception. Finally,
the futility doctrine has been expanded beyond the zoning area.
The practitioner developing an exhaustion argument should still
consider first the precedents directly concerning the agency which
the case concerns. However, an increasing boldness in arguing from
precedents involving other agencies or from the reasons underlying
the exhaustion doctrine is also highly appropriate and may be well
received.

